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Abstract 
With millions of animals brought into existence and raised for food every year, their negative 
impact upon the environment and the staggering growth in the number of chronic diseases 
caused by meat and dairy diets make a global move toward ethical veganism imperative. Typi-
cally, utilitarians and deontologists have led this discussion. The purpose of this paper is to pro-
pose a virtuous approach to ethical veganism. Virtue ethics can be used to construct a defense 
of ethical veganism by relying on the virtues of compassion and fairness. Exercising these values 
in our relations with animals involves acknowledging their moral value, thus seeing that they 
are not our property or our food. It is important to emphasize that this argument applies only 
to well-developed societies that need not rely upon animals as sources of food, clothing, and 
various by-products.
Introduction
Veganism is the moral attitude according to which we 
should avoid using animals as sources of food, clothing 
and by-products, such as eggs, dairy products, honey, 
leather, fur, silk, wool, cosmetics, and soaps derived from 
animals. Some vegans additionally claim we should cat-
egorically avoid products tested on animals; I call this 
view “absolute veganism.” Here, I will not defend such 
a view. I will attempt to defend veganism as a way that 
promotes a more humane and caring world. Such a view 
acknowledges that we are not perfect, but believes that 
we have a responsibility to try our best to avoid using 
animals. 
Both utilitarians and deontologists have made us ques-
tion our treatment of animals. However, millions of ani-
mals are still being exploited. The reason is very complex, 
but the beginning of an explanation is that the wrong 
advocates for animals have been leading the discussion. 
Singer, Regan, and like-minded philosophers have to be 
given credit for bringing the discussion to light and urg-
ing us to question the morality of our relationship with 
animals. However, their essentialist approach has serious 
limitations that has caused a delay in acceptance. Their 
arguments, which rely upon utilitarian calculations of 
overall preferences (Singer, 1975; Singer, 1980; Singer, 
1993), rights (Regan, 2004) and duties (Korsgaard, 2004; 
Korsgaard, 2009), have been incapable of motivating us 
to accept the abolition of factory farming, hunting, and 
animal experimentation. 
Regan and others rely on conceptions of rights and du-
ties that are flawed. Regan argues that we should focus 
on the similarities rather than the differences between 
animals and ourselves. Both Regan and Singer, though 
they propose different ethical accounts, share the idea 
that there is no morally relevant difference between 
animals and humans that could justify animal exploita-
tion.  Therefore, Regan argues that because animals are 
subject to a life like humans, in the sense that they feel 
and have desires and a variety of experiences just like us, 
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and because they can be harmed just like humans, they 
also have a value that should be respected. The difficulty 
with these types of arguments is that the symmetry they 
propose between human and non-human animals is 
questionable. Perhaps it is a form of anthropomorphism 
to argue that our experiences are similar to those of an-
imals in a way that is relevant to morality. As a matter of 
fact, many people find this symmetry argument uncon-
vincing, and are unmoved toward veganism. The trouble 
is that, while it is true that animals suffer, this is not, by 
itself, enough to show that humans and animals are rele-
vantly similar so that human and animal suffering should 
have equal moral importance. 
Consequently, a number of contemporary philosophers 
have emphasized the importance of a virtuous character 
and acquiring the virtues over obeying moral prescrip-
tions derived from universal principles or duty. Howev-
er, the discussion of how a virtuous character leads to 
embracing ethical veganism has not yet been properly 
considered. Husthouse (2006; 2011) illustrates how we 
can account for the ethical treatment of nonhuman ani-
mals through an appeal to virtue ethics. She claims that 
starting with the question of moral status is not correct 
in the animal ethics discussion. Rather, we should begin 
by morally questioning the attitudes that underlie the 
use and abuse of non-human animals. When we do so, 
we often find that we act viciously. Thus, if one is com-
mitted to living a virtuous life, he or she will change his 
or her attitudes toward the use of animals. Abbate (2014) 
entertains the idea that virtue ethics, rather than utilitar-
ianism, duty, or rights, is the appropriate framework for 
developing an animal liberation ethic. Her claim is that 
utilitarianism is overly permissive because it permits the 
harming of animals for trivial reasons, so long as interests 
are maximized. On the other hand, deontological theory 
is too restrictive, since the prohibition on harming non-
human animals would make moral agents incapable of 
responding to moral tragedies that, at times, require that 
some animals be harmed in order to prevent more harm.
Virtue ethics has a wealth of insights that could motivate 
people to become vegans, yet virtue ethicists have never 
offered a virtuous defense of ethical veganism. My thesis 
is that the acquisition of the virtues of compassion and 
fairness may make us see what is virtuous about ethi-
cal veganism. However, it is important to understand 
that my argument applies to those who live in affluent 
societies, who have an abundance of readily availa-
ble plant-based food. I will not, therefore, say anything 
about those societies that have no other alternatives but 
to rely upon animals as sources of sustenance. To show 
why a virtuous approach is preferable, I shall first exam-
ine Korsgaard’s duty view and Singer’s preference utili-
tarianism to show their shortcomings. 
Korsgaard: A Neo Kantian View
To begin with a duty approach, Korsgaard’s lecture “Fel-
low Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals” 
(2004) attempts to show how Kantian ethics can grant 
moral duties toward animals. She argues that if Kant had 
been consistent, he would have realized that animals are 
in a sense ends-in-themselves. The problem is that Kant’s 
ethical system is rather strict because, accordingly, only 
agents that have a rational nature can constrain us 
morally. By rational nature, Kant refers to “…our capac-
ity to govern ourselves by autonomous rational choice” 
(Korsgaard, 2004, p. 3). Humans are rational creatures 
who form what Kant calls the “Kingdom of Ends.” In the 
Kingdom of Ends, each individual is autonomous and 
capable of creating and understanding moral laws. Con-
sequently, we humans have a duty to treat all members 
of our Kingdom with respect. Unfortunately, animals are 
not moral agents because they are not rational in a way 
that they could ever govern themselves by autonomous 
rational choice. Therefore, in terms of Kantian ethics, this 
means that we do not have any moral duties to them, at 
least directly. 
Kant’s view is an argument “from the capacity to obli-
gate, or the lack of that capacity, to the assignment of a 
certain kind of value” (Korsgaard, 2004, p.16-17). In other 
words, Kant does not want to say that animals have no 
value at all, but rather that they are not capable of obli-
gating us to respect moral laws. With regard to the ques-
tion of whether animals are in fact capable of placing us 
under moral obligations, Korsgaard thinks that they are, 
though it appears to be the contrary. Korsgaard’s the-
sis is that “…despite appearances, and despite what he 
himself thought, Kant’s argument reveals the ground of 
our obligations to the other animals” (Korsgaard, 2004, 
p. 5). Korsgaard argues that Kant conflates two concep-
tions of “end-in-itself.” One is the source of normative 
claims recognized by all rational agents, and the other 
sense is someone who is able to give force to a claim 
by participation in morality. Surely animals cannot be 
ends-in-themselves in the second sense, because they 
lack rationality and autonomy; they do not participate 
in morality. However, it does not follow that non-human 
animals cannot be ends-in-themselves in the first sense: 
as the sources of normative claims. It does not follow, 
Korsgaard says, that “there is no sense in which they can 
obligate us.” (Korsgaard, 2004, p. 21) There is, in fact, a 
sense in which animals obligate us.
We take ourselves and our interests to be the source of 
morality. But we do not value our interests only because 
they are the interests of autonomous rational beings. 
Being autonomous and rational allows me to legislate 
against what is bad for me and others like me. However, I 
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do not legislate, for example, against being lied to, being 
injured, being cheated on, etc., only because I am an au-
tonomous and a rational being, but also—perhaps most 
importantly—because bad things assault my animal 
nature. In other words, “we object to pain and torture 
or injury because they are bad for us as animal beings” 
(Korsgaard, 2004, p. 28). In fact, Kant holds that respect 
for our rational nature involves respecting our animal 
nature. This is the ground for his arguments about our 
duties to ourselves, our self-preservation, the enjoyment 
of food, and sex. In Kant’s Groundwork for the Meta-
physics of Morals (1997), the section entitled “A Human 
Being’s Duty to Himself as an Animal Being” (p. 421-428) 
discusses duties to ourselves as animal beings with re-
spect to our animal nature, not rationality. He covers the 
duties not to commit suicide, not to maim or disfigure 
oneself, not to masturbate, and not to indulge in exces-
sive consumption of food or drink. In Religion Within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant (2001) argues that our 
animal nature is one of three “original predispositions to 
good in human nature” (p.74). Thus, for Korsgaard, our 
autonomous nature is not the only source of normative 
claims. Besides our autonomous nature, we derive nor-
mative value from our animal nature. 
The duties we owe to ourselves arise from the natural 
fact that many things can be objectively good or bad for 
us, for example, pain and suffering. Thus, while it is true 
that animals are not self-legislative beings capable of im-
posing laws upon us, it does not follow that we owe no 
moral duties directly to them. In fact, animals, like us, are 
beings for whom things can be good or bad. Therefore, 
Kant is mistaken because he does not recognize this. As 
Korsgaard puts it, “…human incentives are simply the 
same as those of the other animals” (Korsgaard, 2004, p. 
32). She also reminds us that Kant does not believe that 
humans are magnificently unique in the sense that their 
nature is transcendental unlike animals (Korsgaard, 2004, 
p. 33). Humans are not morally superior in this sense for 
Kant. Rather, humans are able to legislate that the things 
that are good for us are the source of normative claims. 
This is certainly one sense in which humans are ends-in-
themselves; the other sense is that they have an animal 
nature. Thus, animal nature is an end-in-itself—and it fol-
lows that we have direct duties to other animals.
            For Korsgaard, Kant was wrong about claiming 
that only rational beings can place us under moral ob-
ligation. However, I doubt that Korsgaard’s attempt is 
successful. Korsgaard’s success in showing that we have 
direct duties to animals on Kantian grounds hinges on 
the question of whether Kant in fact overlooked the im-
plications of his own principle. I do not think it is clear 
that Kant would concede that having an animal nature 
is morally important, because when we legislate against 
things that assault us, we in fact make laws against them 
because they assault our animal nature. Kant may argue 
that having an animal nature may be a sufficient condi-
tion for having direct duties to other rational beings, but 
not a necessary condition. Our animal nature is, after all, 
“attached” to a rational nature, whereas animals (accord-
ing to Kant) are completely devoid of a rational nature—
and that is why they cannot put us under moral obliga-
tion, i.e., we do not have direct moral duties to them.
Korsgaard’s view on our duties towards animals fails as a 
moral theory in favor of animals because her view is ul-
timately concerned with notions of obligation and right 
conduct. The problem is her conception of morality as 
a set of universal and authoritative norms by which all 
moral agents are categorically obligated to follow. Kors-
gaard argues in an interview with Schaubroeck (2009), 
Morality assigns us purposes, it is our moral duty 
to help those in need for its own sake—not to 
help those in need for something else. We are 
creatures who adopt our purposes—they are not 
given to us by our desires, and that means we 
need principles to guide their adoption. (p. 55)
To show why Korsgaard’s moral outlook about our treat-
ment of animals fails, I want to consider Stocker’s criti-
cism of duty-based theories. Stocker (1976) goes directly 
to the heart of the problem as he writes,
These theories [referring to Kantian and utilitar-
ian ethics] are, thus, doubly defective. As ethical 
theories, they fail by making it impossible for a 
person to achieve the good in an integrated way. 
As theories of the mind, of reasons and motives, 
of human life and activity, they fail, not only by 
putting us in a position that is psychologically 
uncomfortable, difficult, or even untenable, but 
also by making us and our lives essentially frag-
mented and incoherent. (p. 455)
As Stocker points out, a theory that emphasizes duty 
leads us to moral schizophrenia. Imagine that you are in 
a hospital, recovering from an illness. Your friend, Smith, 
comes in to visit you, and this makes you happy. How-
ever, you find out that Smith is unenthusiastic about 
visiting you. In fact, he’d rather be somewhere else. He 
came to see you not because he has a desire to see you 
or he loves you and he is concerned about your health, 
but rather, as it turns out, because he is a deontologist 
who is committed to acting out of duty, regardless of 
how he feels about a certain action. Now think about 
this moral outlook when applied to the treatment of an-
imals. Such a moral view asks us to respect animals be-
cause we should recognize that we have certain moral 
duties toward them. Such a theory of supposed duties 
is neither able to convince many, nor to motivate those 
who might be convinced. It appears clear that duty ap-
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proaches distort our view of morality because they focus 
on duty rather than the individual themselves.
Utilitarianism and Unreasonable Demands
Having considered a duty view, I shall now consider 
preference utilitarianism. Singer’s preference utilitarian-
ism takes the right action to be the one whose conse-
quences promote the preferences of beings that have 
preferences, namely, sentient beings. Singer uses his 
preference utilitarianism to show that humans have a 
moral obligation to stop raising animals for food and 
stop using animals as subjects for scientific research. His 
ideas are mainly found in Animal Liberation (1975) and 
Practical Ethics (1993). These two works, among others 
by Singer, have played a vital role in shaping the con-
temporary animal rights movement and the philosophy 
of vegetarianism.  
According to preference utilitarianism, the right action, 
rather than calculating pleasure against pain, is one that 
promotes the best interests of the greatest number. 
Based on this ethical view, Singer (1980) claims that “ap-
plying the principle of utility to our present situation—
especially the methods now used to rear animals for food 
and the variety of foods available to us—leads to the 
conclusion that we ought to be vegetarians” (p. 137). But 
is it true that utilitarianism makes a strong demand of us 
to become vegetarians and to shun animal exploitation? 
In what follows, I want to show that utilitarianism is not 
a viable moral system to claim and support the rights of 
animals and does not lead necessarily to vegetarianism; 
in fact, that utilitarianism does not underwrite concern 
about the welfare of animals at all.  
A statement that Singer (1993) makes in the early pages 
of his Practical Ethics adroitly captures his view: 
The way of thinking I have outlined is a form of 
utilitarianism. It differs from classical utilitarian-
ism in that ‘best consequences’ is understood as 
meaning what, on balance, furthers the interests 
of those affected, rather than merely what in-
creases pleasure and reduces pain. (It has, how-
ever, been suggested that classical utilitarians 
like Bentham and John Stuart Mill used ‘pleasure’ 
and ‘pain’ in a broad sense that allowed them to 
include achieving what one desired as a ‘pleas-
ure’ and the reverse as a ‘pain’). (p. 14)
While for Kant, rationality is the locus of morality, accord-
ing to utilitarianism, sentience is the starting point of 
moral consideration, the special characteristic that con-
fers upon a being moral worth. As explained by Singer 
(1993),
If a being suffers, there can be no moral justifi-
cation for refusing to take that suffering into 
consideration. No matter what the nature of the 
being, the principle of equality requires that its 
suffering be counted equally with the like suf-
fering—in so far as rough comparisons can be 
made—of any other being. ( p. 15)
For utilitarians, if a being can feel pain and pleasure, it is 
a sentient and moral agent, and consequently it counts 
morally. Therefore, what this means is that not only hu-
mans are moral agents worthy of moral consideration, 
but many animals, as well. 
Diamond (1978) makes a valuable point about Singer’s 
approach. She points out that Singer’s position contains 
“fundamental confusion about moral relations between 
people and people and between people and animals” (p. 
466). She says that the analogies used in these types of 
arguments are not clear at all, and thus it is difficult to see 
how they move from consideration of human preferenc-
es to consideration of animal preferences. Moreover, the 
argument prevents us from seeing what is really impor-
tant in our relations with other people and with animals. 
What’s fundamentally wrong with this kind of argument 
is that it begins by asking the wrong question: What 
grounds do we have to claim that humans have certain 
rights while animals do not? For it asks why we don’t kill 
people or inflict suffering on them, while we are willing 
to do just that to animals. Diamond (1978) argues, “This 
is a totally wrong way of beginning the discussion, be-
cause it ignores certain quite central facts—facts which, 
if attended to, would make it clear that rights are not 
what is crucial” (p. 467). 
We do not eat people (typically), but not because of utili-
tarian principles, i.e., because they have preferences, and 
they prefer not to be eaten. Rather we don’t eat people 
simply because we do not regard them as food. Even if 
people wouldn’t mind being eaten, and they died in ac-
cidents, and human flesh were delicious and nutritious, 
we would still not eat them. But then it seems that Sing-
er’s argument is uneven, because it suggests that we do 
not maltreat other human beings or animals because 
they have preferences by virtue of their being sentient. 
However, if the analogy holds for animals, and demands 
that we not eat them or experiment on them because 
doing so may deprive them of their preferences, thus 
negatively affect aggregative utility, then this principle 
should also hold for humans. Namely, eating people 
would turn out not to be permissible because it deprives 
humans of their preferences. But again, this is clearly not 
the reason we do not eat people. Anyone who argues 
this way, Diamond (1978) says, “runs a risk of leaving al-
together out of his discussion those fundamental fea-
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tures of our relationship to other human beings which 
are involved in our not eating them.” (p. 467)
My objections to Singer’s moral approach are, by and 
large, in line with Diamond’s, though it seems to me that 
there is even more to be said on the topic than Diamonds 
and others have said. While utilitarianism is theoretically 
appealing, I want to propose that no one really lives this 
way. Suppose a person dear to you is hopelessly ill. As a 
utilitarian, it might turn out, upon calculation, that you 
should let her die so as to maximize utility by using the 
money and care required to look after her to diminish 
the suffering of many others. In the 1999 profile by Mi-
chael Specter featured in The New Yorker, Singer makes 
it very clear what he thinks about such a situation, as he 
states, “The notion that human life is sacred just because 
it’s human life is medieval.” Regarding the hopelessly ill, 
he states, “The person that used to be there is gone. It 
doesn’t matter how sad it makes us. All I am saying is that 
it’s time to stop pretending that the world is not the way 
we know it to be” (p. 55). Singer argues that the idea that 
human life is sacred is obsolete. But what are the results 
of approaching morality this way?
Highly rational and impersonal theories do not help us 
understand the moral worth of humans and animals. 
In fact, when an individual close to us is very ill, our 
response is seldom controlled by the rational, prefer-
ence-calculating, utilitarian principles, but rather by our 
virtue. As Donovan (2006) writes, “sympathy, empathy, 
and compassion [are] relevant ethical and epistemolog-
ical sources for human treatment of nonhuman animals” 
(p. 306). The calculations that utilitarianism makes, while 
theoretically attractive, hardly apply in real life. About 
this issue, Williams says, 
You can’t make these calculations and compari-
sons in real life. It’s bluff... One of the reasons his 
[Singer’s] approach is so popular is that it reduces 
all moral puzzlement to a formula. You remove 
puzzlement and doubt and conflict of values, 
and it’s in the scientific spirit. People seem to 
think it will all add up, but it never does, because 
humans never do. (Specter, 1999, p. 55)
The last words of the above citation, “because humans 
never do” are crucial: morality conceived as a formu-
la fails because abstract reasoning cannot capture the 
moral complexity of humanity. Moral puzzlements re-
quire more than formulas; they require attentiveness, 
love, care, and a conception of human beings as intrin-
sically valuable. In Practical Ethics, Singer (1993) writes, 
“ethics is not an ideal system that is noble in theory but 
no good in practice. The reverse is closer to the truth: an 
ethical judgment that is no good in practice must suffer 
from a theoretical defect” (p. 2). It would seem, then, that 
if utilitarians are sincere in their desire to propose a mor-
al view that is noble in theory and good in practice, they 
must abandon their view that calculation of utility is all 
we require if we wish to deal with moral issues. Thus, I ar-
gue, utilitarianism is not a viable ethical theory that can 
be applied to the question of our treatment of animals 
because it ignores our love for, and relationship with, an-
imals and people, at the expense of satisfying preferenc-
es or happiness for the greatest number.
Virtue Ethics
Virtue ethics (VE) maintains that our moral experience 
and our relation with others are too complex, too nu-
anced, and too textured to be captured and understood 
by a set of principles or rational calculation. When we 
theorize, we detach ourselves from our moral experi-
ence and our moral feelings.  In the Greek myth, Procru-
stes offered his bed to guests who wanted to spend the 
night. If the guests were too long for the bed, Procrustes 
would chop off their legs; and if they were too short, he 
would stretch them so that they could fit. Deontology 
and utilitarianism have done to morality what Procru-
stes used to do to his guests. VE, therefore, believes that 
the correct way to understand and approach morality is 
to consider each situation and determine what the ap-
propriate moral approach should be and which action 
should be carried out. Most importantly, VE recognizes 
that people’s motives, character, and reasons for acting 
in certain ways are more important than any theory that 
claims to give moral directions. In other words, if people 
are honest, fair, compassionate, just, and more, by virtue 
of their characters, they will do what is right, for the right 
reason, in a given circumstance. 
VE emphasizes the kind of person one is. There are im-
portant factors in morality: whether an intention is right, 
whether one is following the correct rule, or whether the 
consequences of action are good. But these factors are 
not primary. What is primary is whether the individual’s 
actions are expressions of good character. When we help 
a friend, for example, we do so out of friendship and not 
for the sake of it. According to VE, if you are my friend, I 
help you because I like you and care about you and take 
pleasure in helping you, and not because I think that I 
have a moral duty to help you or because it turns out that 
my helping you will maximize overall utility. This aspect 
of VE is one of the main points of disagreement between 
VE and nor-aretaic moral theories. VE regards a virtuous 
individual as someone who has the virtues; virtues have 
morally right desires built in. In Book II.1 of Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle (1990) discusses the question of how 
one acquires moral virtues, “the virtues . . . we acquire by 
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having first put them into action” (II.2.1103a30). This is 
possible because the capacity for virtue is innate, but has 
to be brought to a fully developed state through prac-
tice. For example, it is by repeatedly performing gener-
ous acts that one develops the virtue of generosity; it 
is by repeatedly refusing to indulge one’s appetite that 
one develops the virtue of temperance. However, not 
every generous or temperate act is virtuous. If I spend 
my entire paycheck to buy a friend a car or if I refrain 
from eating all together, or I eat far too much, then I am 
not doing what is virtuous. Also, consider courage: be-
ing courageous is not to lack fear, but to perform in spite 
of fear. But if I express my courage by robbing a bank, I 
am not exercising my courage in a way that is virtuous. 
Why? Simply because robbing a bank is an action pro-
ceeding from a vice that goes against other virtues, such 
as justice. According to VE, the best ways to promote so-
cial cooperation and harmony is for people to acquire a 
good, reliable character. Rules by themselves may give 
guidelines, but they cannot make people good. Conse-
quences of our actions are important, but without good 
intentions, we are not likely to produce greater total sat-
isfaction than other theories try to achieve by detached 
theorizing. 
How Compassion and Fairness Make Us Understand 
What is Virtuous about Veganism
People use animals for food, clothing, cosmetics, scien-
tific research, and many other purposes. Unbeknown to 
many our relationship with animals is cruel and immoral. 
The reality is that we bring into existence and raise mil-
lions of animals in cages, feed them poisons and chem-
icals, cut them into pieces of various shapes and forms, 
cook them, and consume their flesh. All this happens 
before our eyes without our realizing its viciousness. As 
I will argue, morality is about having a noble character. 
What we do to animals, anyway we word it or try to jus-
tify, is ignoble. 
I believe that virtue ethics may lead us to the conclu-
sion that those who live in affluent societies, who enjoy 
an abundance of plant-based foods, should become 
vegans. VE does this by showing the necessity to have, 
among many others virtues, compassion and fairness, 
both of which enable a sensitivity to unnecessary cru-
elty and suffering. If one acquires these virtues, he will 
be compassionate, sensitive to cruelty, resist injustice, 
and possibly see that veganism is a virtuous practice. 
The practices of eating animals and using them in vari-
ous aspects of our lives often entail vices, such as intem-
perance, cruelty, injustice, and lack of compassion and 
empathy. I am not suggesting that there are absolute 
rights and wrongs; that is not the project of virtue ethics. 
The main characteristic of the virtuous person is that he 
or she does the best thing in a situation, all things con-
sidered. But if virtue ethics is correct in saying that what 
is important in morality are a good moral character and 
acting out of virtue, rather than worry about duty or the 
way to reduce the total amount of suffering in the world, 
what are the virtues that illuminate our understanding 
that veganism is a virtuous practice? Although many vir-
tues could be appealed to, I want to consider, in particu-
lar, the virtue of compassion and the virtue of fairness.
 
Compassion
Compassion is a virtue rooted in love; it is a deep con-
cern about the pain of the sufferer, with the hope of 
alleviating it and that some positive good will emerge 
from the sufferer’s unfortunate situation. In fact, com-
passion is also a deep concern for others’ happiness and 
joy. Helping others who are suffering is very important; 
it is what a compassionate person does. But it is equally 
important to take positive action to increase or maintain 
others’ happiness. Since animals are capable of suffer-
ing or living a pleasant life, a compassionate individual 
would avoid practices that cause pain to animals and 
also would try to maintain their happiness. A true virtue, 
after all, strives to produce a good life for us and for oth-
ers. A compassionate individual feels sympathy for those 
who suffer. Sympathy is an important moral feeling be-
cause it allows us to respond to something unfortunate 
or unpleasant happening to others. When an elderly 
person is entering a building, a sympathetic person will 
hold the door for him. When an animal is hurt, the sym-
pathetic person will offer help. But most importantly, a 
compassionate person has empathy. Empathy is relat-
ed to sympathy, but goes deeper in that it “recognizes 
connection with an understanding of the circumstances 
of the other” (Gruen, 2014, p. 45). An empathetic indi-
vidual tries to understand thoroughly the situation and 
circumstances of others and cares about their well-be-
ing. These ‘others’ may be close to us or far away, other 
humans or non-human animals. Empathy enables us to 
extend our love to victims of some natural catastrophe, 
for example, who may live on the other side of the world. 
In the case of our treatment of non-human animals, the 
compassionate individual has empathy for them and 
tries to understand what matters for them. Thus, a com-
passionate individual understands that animals exist 
for their own benefit and do not desire to die or to be 
turned into food or spend their existence inside a cage. 
A compassionate individual, therefore, will not merely 
try to alleviate the pain of an animal who, for instance, 
is about to be slaughtered by caressing him or by giv-
ing him a tranquillizer or by making his death as quick as 
possible. This would not be the full expression of com-
passion. Rather, a compassionate, empathetic individual 
also recognizes that animals do not only wish to avoid 
pain, but also wish to survive and flourish. Consequent-
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ly, by definition, a compassionate person would oppose 
all forms of animal exploitation. But just like other vir-
tues, compassion seems to lie between two excesses. 
One way, for example, an individual would be too com-
passionate is by putting his own well-being at risk. For 
example, it would be a form of excess of compassion if 
one refused to wash his hands to protect germs, or if he 
denied food to his children to feed strangers, or allowed 
rats to take over his apartment. On the other hand, one 
would not be compassionate enough if he deliberately 
killed animals for fun, or just for the sake of it; or, having 
an abundance of food, he refused to share it with others 
in need. In the present case, veganism is the idea that 
animals do not belong to us and thus they are not food 
or property. Considering that humans can thrive on a ve-
gan diet, and considering that the animals that people 
eat are domesticated farm animals, the compassionate 
individual will avoid eating those animals or any other 
practice that involves animal by-products. 
A person may be thought to be compassionate because 
she cares about humans and animals within her own 
circle. For example, many people consider themselves 
compassionate individuals and animal lovers. However, 
their compassion is limited to the people around them 
and their pets; the limit of their compassion is evinced by 
the fact that they may eat meat. This attitude is not, how-
ever, a virtuous one. Compassion must be consistently 
extended to all animals and people outside one’s moral 
circle. The failure to extend compassion to all animals—
not just to companions—creates an incompleteness of 
the virtue. For VE, it is not sufficient to be compassionate 
only in some instances (Hursthouse, 1999, p. 14). There-
fore, one may not claim to be compassionate in the com-
plete sense of the virtue if one’s actions are directed only 
toward humans or a restricted circle of animals. One must 
be thoroughly and consistently compassionate toward 
all beings. One is not truly compassionate by simply re-
fraining from directly being cruel to or directly exploiting 
animals. One must also not be party to the exploitation 
of animals; he must not purchase leather, fur, meat, or 
choose to remain ignorant or inactive by shrugging it off 
and saying that he cannot do anything about it.
Since an important component of compassion is empa-
thy, a compassionate individual recognizes and appreci-
ates the unique characteristics and needs of everything 
and everyone. When we are attentive to the needs of 
others, and thus realize that the lives of people, and of 
many animals, are important to them, we are moved to 
value their lives and happiness and we desire to relieve 
their suffering and to further their happiness. Therefore, 
compassion makes us understand that veganism is a vir-
tuous practice.
Fairness
It seems that virtually all people who care about morality 
want to be or strive to be fair. But what does that mean? 
If we stand in a long line and one person tries to cut into 
the line, we say it’s unfair. Exploiting people is unfair. 
Hurting a child intentionally is unfair. Hurting a dog is 
unfair. The fair-minded individual acts out of justice to 
ensure that everyone receives what he or she deserves. 
Treating others fairly means ensuring that they receive 
the deserved reward or punishment. A fair individual 
does not exploit others for his own benefit; he tries to 
be impartial by treating others equally. If exploiting hu-
mans or causing suffering to them is wrong, but it is not 
considered wrong in the case of animals, this is not im-
partial. The fair individual is fair to all individuals regard-
less of their skin color, nationality, height, age, species, 
and so on. Eating and using animals causes countless 
animals to suffer and be killed for trivial reasons, such 
as taste, fashion, and amusement. In affluent societies, 
where food is abundant and we have no need to use an-
imals for food or clothing, our treatment of animals is, by 
definition, especially unfair.
We cause animals to suffer because we use them. Ani-
mals experience the world. They are individuals. They 
don’t want to be used by us, but rather enjoy their ex-
istence the same way we want to enjoy ours. And once 
again, consider that to have good lives, we don’t need to 
use animals for food or other purposes; that eating ani-
mals and their by-products can be bad for our health; and 
that intensive livestock production can harm the envi-
ronment. It follows that tradition, convenience, and taste 
are not good reasons to use animals, even ‘humanely.’ If 
we are consistently fair, we will not merely try to amelio-
rate their living conditions, but rather avoid exploiting 
them in the first place. Using their bodies, their skin, their 
milk, their fur, or their eggs is unfair. Also, using some an-
imals but not others is unfair. In Western societies, dogs, 
cats, some birds, and some fish are considered pets; but 
other birds, fish, cows, and pigs, are considered food. 
Of course, being a pet does not entail that an animal is 
treated well. The vast majority of pets are also treated 
callously. However, the only way to be fair is not to use 
animals at all. Again, this does not mean that we should 
endanger our health by allowing lice to proliferate in our 
hair or cockroaches in our apartments. Because VE does 
not require moral absolutes, it is consistent with fairness 
that we should not intentionally destroy or harm other 
living beings; but, by the same token, it would not be fair 
to allow other organisms to harm us. In the case of lice, 
for example, if possible, one should try to remove them 
without harming them. Shaving one’s hair seems to be 
a fair compromise. Thus, fairness entails that we should 
not exploit or intentionally hurt or kill, which means go-
ing vegan. Therefore, fairness also shows that veganism 
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is a virtuous practice and lifestyle.
Where We Draw the Line
A skeptic of the idea that we should all become vegans 
may point out that being virtuous does not guarantee 
that we embrace veganism. One may ask, “But where do 
we draw the line?” Veganism, as I see it, is the idea that 
animals do not belong to us. This implies that using them 
is immoral. But which animals are we talking about? All 
animals? All insects? Where do we draw the line of re-
spect for animals? These questions seem to me to make 
sense in a context of an ethic that emphasizes univer-
sal rules or one that proposes a common denominator 
for respecting animals, such as sentience, as the locus 
of morality. The point of VE is not to draw lines because, 
as I have explained, VE is a moral approach that deem-
phasizes universal rules and consequences and focuses 
instead on the character of the agent. An agent who has 
a consistently benevolent, compassionate, temperate, 
and just character will always behave in ways that are 
benevolent, compassionate, temperate, and just. He or 
she will always act well. Conversely, an agent who is not 
virtuous will have to rely upon and follow universal rules 
or prescriptions derived from some utilitarian calculus; 
but there is no guarantee that the agent will be willing 
to act according to those rules or that the agent will be 
satisfied by his required actions. When we approach mo-
rality from virtue, we are asked to take into account the 
relevant facts of a given situation, rather than abstract-
ing those facts. In other words, a utilitarian, for example, 
may propose that in our dealings with animals, we give 
equal consideration to all those beings that have prefer-
ences. The utilitarian, then, may draw a line and declare 
that, because a fetus or a mosquito are not the kinds of 
beings whose preferences could be satisfied or frustrat-
ed, we cast them outside the moral community. Kantian 
ethics is another perfect example of this. According to 
Kant, the so-called line has to be drawn in accordance 
with rationality; and since animals are not rational, we 
have no direct moral duty to them. 
VE sees the issue differently. A compassionate individu-
al, for example, is concerned about the well-being of all 
living things. He respects all creatures because all have 
a dignity and deserve moral respect. For a virtuous in-
dividual, it is not the case that only certain beings have 
moral worth, while others are absolutely worthless or ir-
relevant. This is an attitude embedded in the virtues. A 
virtuous individual respects insects in that he does not 
kill them intentionally or take pleasure out of torturing 
or killing them. Since he also respects nature, he will not 
destroy plants needlessly or pollute waters. At the same 
time, VE is consistent in its approach because it does not 
categorically prohibit killing animals who threaten our 
lives or insects that, for example, might infest our homes. 
In such circumstances, a virtuous individual is morally 
consistent. With regard to veganism, considering that 
we can conduct our lives without using animals for food, 
clothing, or other purposes, exploiting them is inconsist-
ent with the virtues.
VE leads to ethical veganism because the virtuous 
person is compassionate and fair, which entails the 
avoidance or reduction of violence humans perpetrate 
against other living beings. It is a more nuanced attitude 
than simply drawing lines. Rather, it is an approach that 
invites us to fine-tune our dietary practices in keeping 
with the philosophical and moral considerations of what 
all living beings are, what they are capable of, and what 
our relation to them is and should be. Returning to the 
idea of compassion, I argued that a compassionate in-
dividual is concerned about the well-being of all living 
things. He or she respects all creatures because all have 
a dignity and deserve moral respect. So, one may object 
that since plants are also exploited and used as food, it 
would seem to follow that a virtuous individual would 
also avoid eating them.1  In other words, why is eating 
plants compassionate but eating animal by-products is 
not? I think the answer starts by considering that the ac-
tions of a virtuous individual are measured according to 
the given circumstances. Compassion is applied in differ-
ent degrees according to the particular living organism. 
This means that while a compassionate individual has 
moral respect for all living things, the degree of respect 
is different for different beings and different situations. 
Considering the cognitive capacities that animals have, 
and considering the horrendous practices required to 
turn animals into food, it is reasonable to say that a com-
passionate individual avoids using animals because it 
causes pain and suffering to them. In this case, a com-
passionate individual may consistently eat plants but 
avoid eating animals and their by-products because us-
ing plants does not require those painful practices that I 
outlined above. It might turn out that plants have certain 
important cognitive capacities, that they are sentient; 
but it is reasonable to say that it is more compassionate 
to use them than to exploit animals who exhibit a high-
er degree of sentience and conscious experience of the 
world. Namely, unlike plants, animals are social creatures 
possessing cognitive capacities, by virtue of which they 
experience the world. We see that they are not mere ob-
jects but beings that experience feelings of fear and joy, 
and have relationships with friends and with their own 
offspring.  
1  For a discussion of plant ethics, see Marder (2013)
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Plants are alive and feel pain, too. 
Why vegans eat plants. Granted, plants are living organ-
isms. A compassionate individual, then, must make a 
choice between eating animals and their by-products or 
eating plants. The compassionate approach is to choose 
to use those organisms that are less likely to be morally 
disrespected. For plants, “being alive” is different from 
that of animals in a way that makes it difficult to see in 
what sense it could be said that we wrong or disrespect 
a plant by eating it. Rice, mangoes, beans, bananas, let-
tuce, or broccoli do not seem to have conscious experi-
ences or to be concerned about their existence. It is very 
unlikely that they enjoy life and the company of their 
parents and friends, like animals and people do. 
Furthermore, the most important aspect of VE as it re-
lates to the question of whether plants can feel pain, and 
whether veganism is a compassionate moral position is 
this: VE concerns organisms that are alive, but it also con-
cerns nature. It is not the case that a virtuous individual 
would have no moral feelings or respect for mountains 
and water, but only for living and breathing organisms. 
This is a mistaken conception of VE. As Murdoch (1970) 
argues, “The moral life…is something that goes on con-
tinually, not something that switches off in between the 
occurrence of explicit moral choices. What happens in 
between such choices is indeed what is crucial” (p. 8). 
The virtuous individual is respectful of all things—moun-
tains, rivers, and the whole of nature. His eating choices 
are informed by virtue and his actions are always appro-
priate in relation to the good of not only himself, but also 
nature as a whole. Therefore, vegans eat plants because 
it is consistent with compassion and fairness to do so. 
It would be uncompassionate and unfair, for example, 
to deliberately damage or destroy plants. But the fact 
is that plants give us a vast variety of fruits that can be 
eaten without being imprisoned or tortured, disrespect-
ed, killed, or separated from family and friends. These 
considerations make us realize that there are degrees of 
moral respect toward different forms of life. The degree 
of compassion that we have for a cow need not be the 
same as that we have for a mango. Therefore, a compas-
sionate individual should avoid using animals and their 
by-products because exploiting animals causes them a 
great degree of suffering. By using their milk, eggs, or la-
bor, we disrespect them. Animal by-products are typical-
ly obtained through practices that make them suffer or 
disrespect them. But in the case of plants, although they 
are living organisms, our using them does not require 
the same cruel practices that inflict pain upon animals. 
Conclusion
I want to conclude this discussion by once again point-
ing out that veganism, as I have defined it, is an expres-
sion of virtue. That is to say, veganism is the moral idea of 
avoiding using animal as a source of food, clothing, and 
more, whenever there are readily available alternatives. 
As I mentioned at the outset, my argument applies to 
those of us who have the fortune to live in affluent soci-
eties that enjoy an abundance of plant-based food and 
alternatives to wool, leather, and other animal-based 
by-products. Such circumstances, I believe, demand that 
we apply compassion and fairness to our relationship 
with animals. I am not suggesting that there are absolute 
rights and wrongs. The main characteristic of the virtu-
ous person is that she does the best thing in a situation, 
all things considered. There are possible circumstances 
in which a virtuous character is compatible with using 
animals. Such circumstances might include, for exam-
ple, a population that has no other means of sustenance 
but animals, or a lifeboat hypothetical, i.e., a situation in 
which a person or a group of people are stranded on a 
desert island with no food other than animals. Perhaps 
an important implication is that affluent societies ap-
plying VE should help less developed countries move 
toward veganism. For example, consider that some of 
these populations do have plant food, but do not use it. 
As Oppenlander (2013) notes in Food Choice and Sus-
tainability,
In Ethiopia, over 40 percent of the population 
is considered hungry or starving, yet the coun-
try has 50 million cattle (one of the largest herds 
in the world), as well as almost 50 million sheep 
and goats, and 35 million chickens, unnecessarily 
consuming the food, land and water… 
Much of their resource use must be focused on 
these cattle. Instead of using their food, water, 
topsoil, and massive amounts of land and en-
ergy to raise livestock, Ethiopia, for instance, 
could grow teff, an ancient and quite nutritious 
grain grown in that country for the past 20,000 
to 30,000 years. Teff…is high in protein, with an 
excellent amino acid profile, is high in fiber and 
calcium, (1 cup of teff provides more calcium 
than a cup of milk), and is a rich source of boron, 
copper, phosphorus, zinc, and iron. Seventy per-
cent of all Ethiopia’s cattle are raised pastorally in 
the highlands of their country, where less than 
100 pounds of meat and a few gallons of milk 
are produced per acre of land used. Researchers 
have found that teff can be grown in those same 
areas by the same farmers at a yield of 2,000 to 
3,000 pounds per acre, with more sustainable 
growing techniques employed and no water ir-
rigation — teff has been shown to grow well in 
water-stressed areas and it is pest resistant. (p. 
175-178)
There are other regions of the world where inhabitants 
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can import food staples, thus avoid relying on animals 
for food.  An example often used is the Inuit, who inhabit 
the artic regions of Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. Not 
having fields suitable to grow food for all their meals, the 
Inuit traditionally ate only fish and seal meat. But nowa-
days, the Inuit live in communities with stores, schools, 
and modern buildings. Modern Inuit import food grown 
elsewhere and buy it in local stores. In fact, according 
to the Inuit Cultural Online Resource (n.d.), “Expensive 
food [is] bought at the local Co-op or Northern store, or 
shipped up from the south.” 
My contribution to the discussion of our moral respon-
sibility toward animals is to provide a vision of a moral 
lifestyle, rather than a moral theory, that motivates us in-
ternally to become vegans. I proposed a view of morality 
according to which we acquire and develop important 
moral virtues, particularly the virtues of compassion and 
fairness, through paying attention to the lives of animals. 
Much work still needs to be done on the application of 
virtue/care ethics to eating with regard to our relation-
ships with animals and with regard to the environment, 
public health and human rights. This paper is a starting 
point for the arduous work of defending ethical vegan-
ism. I have demonstrated how virtue ethics leads to eth-
ical veganism. VE has much to say about how we apply 
attention, care, and virtue to animals’ experiences of 
well-being, to recognizing that we are in a relationship 
with them and the only consistent moral response is ve-
ganism.
With regard to our treatment of animals, many virtues 
are important, though I propose that two in particular, 
compassion and fairness, enable us to see what is mor-
ally virtuous about veganism. Veganism is a worldview 
that wants us to realize that animals are not our property 
or our food; so, we should not use them in any way. Com-
passion and fairness show that an individual endowed 
with these two virtues thoroughly understands the suf-
fering of animals and tries to alleviate their suffering. 
Our current behavior, i.e., eating animals and using their 
by-products, causes unnecessary pain to animals. One 
cannot be, for example, a compassionate racist or a fair 
rapist. As compassion is rooted in love, one who is truly 
compassionate will act out of love. There is nothing lov-
ing about racism or participating in the slaughtering and 
suffering of millions of animals. By the same token, one 
is not fair-minded if he is fair only to a restricted group 
of people or to his country, species, race, etc. Being fair 
means treating all equally. With regard to our treatment 
of non-human animals and our environment, a compas-
sionate individual, by the very definition of compassion, 
desires to avoid pain because he is interested in others’ 
well-being. Veganism, then, may be an expression of 
compassion. The compassionate individual refuses to 
take part in a practice centered on animal exploitation. 
Fairness also entails veganism, because the fair-minded 
behave in a way that is consistently just. It is unfair to 
treat certain animals with respect and not others, and it 
is unfair to turn animals into food for the sake of taste, 
tradition, or just because we can, when those animals 
do not wish to become food. Therefore, using animals as 
food, even if they are treated ‘humanely,’ is inconsistent 
with fairness and with compassion. Thus, virtue ethics 
can show us that veganism is a virtuous practice that 
should be embraced by most if not all people. 
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